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lNrERNATIONAL LAw-PruZE LAw-SEIZURE OF PoRT AS EFFECTING CAPTURE
OF SHIPS IN PoRT-When the Italian port of Tripoli was captured by the British
in January, 1943, two privately owned Italian vessels were lying aground in the
harbor. Though the Italian armistice was signed in September, 1943, and British
naval authorities early in 1944 ordered the seizure in prize of all salvable vessels,
nothing was done with respect to these vessels until February 3, 1947. At that
time they were placed under the jurisdiction of the Prize Court of England. On
February 10, 1947, the Treaty of Peace with Italy1 was signed and became effective on September 15, 1947. By act of Parliament,2 implemented by Treaty of
Peace (Italy) Order, 1948, it became the law of Great Britain. Meanwhile, in
May, writs in prize had been issued for the condemnation of the two vessels. In
1948, the Italian owners appeared as claimants and sought their release. Article
76 of the treaty provides that "Italy waives all claims of any description against the
Allied and Associated Powers on behalf of the Italian government or Italian nationals arising directly out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence
of i state of war in Europe after September l, 1939 ... including ... (d) claims
arising out of the exercise or purported exercise of belligerent rights. 2. The provisions of this article shall bar, completely and finally, all claims of the nature
referred to herein, which will be henceforward extinguished, whoever may be the
parties in interest.•.." It was the owners' contention that capture was not effected
until after the armistice, and was therefore neither an actual nor purported exercise of belligerent rights within the meaning of the treaty. Held, condemnation
ordered. Assuming that the armistice terminated the right to make captures, capture was purportedly and actually accomplished by the seizure of the port, so the
treaty operates to bar the owners' claims. The Bellaman, [1948] 2 All Eng. L. Rep.
679.
Vessels belonging to nationals of warring states are, with exceptions irrelevant

1 Treaty of Peace, Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1648, also in
42 AM. J. lNT. L. OFFICIAL DocUl\mNTS, 47 (1948).
2 IQ & 11 Geo. 6, c. 23 (1947).
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here, 3 subject to capture by the enemy during the period of belligerency.4 As long
as capture is effected during this period, subsequent termination of hostilities does
not terminate the right of the capturing nation to proceed to condemn the vessels
in prize.6 Since the owner of the captured vessel is not divested of his property
until it is condemned by a prize court, he has a right to appear in the condemnation
proceeding and assert his claim of ownership. 6 But the law to be applied by the
prize court is the municipal law of the country in which it sits.7 Hence, the governing law of the principal case includes the Treaty of Peace with Italy. The clear
purpose of article 76 is to preclude the litigation of "all claims of any description"
when the acts giving rise to the claims can in any reasonable way be explained as
an exercise of belligerent rights. 8 Since the facts indicated that there might have
been a capture of the ships when the port was seized, this would have been sufficient
ground alone for bringing the claim within the provisions of the treaty. But, to
meet the argument that the owners were "claimants" in prize court nomenclature
only and not within the meaning of the treaty, and that their claims were therefore
not barred by the treaty, the court proceeds to determine whether capture of the
vessels was actually effected by seizure of the port. When a manned vessel is
captured, there must be a power and intent by the captor to control, as well as an
intent by the captured vessel to submit to control.9 However, where vessels are
lying in port and unmanned, capture has been found to occur with seizure of the
port.10 It is not clear that the requirement of intent to capture is abrogated, but
the intent that is necessary is found in the intent to control the port.11 The inability
of the vessels to resist or escape removes the requirement of intent to submit. It
thus appears that the court properly finds an actual capture at the time of the
seizure of the port, even though there was a subsequent violation of the Naval
Prize Act requirement that captured vessels be brought "forthwith" before a prize
court.12
David D. Ring, S. Ed.
3 See GARNER, PRIZE I.Aw, c. 6 § 7 (1927).
4Id., § 139.
6 Id.,§ 141; CoLoMBos, I.Aw OF PRIZE, 2d ed., 167 (1940).
6 CoLoMBos, I.Aw OF PRIZE, 2d ed., 312 (1940).
7 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 378 (1940); Allin, ''English and German Prize Courts," 2 MINN. L. REv. 22 (1917); cf. 7 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 289-294 (1943).
8 All treaties executed by the Allied and Associated Powers after World War II contain
a provision identical to article 76 of the treaty with Italy. Cf. phraseology of treaties after,
World War I to the effect that "[n]o claim ••• shall be made ••• in respect of any act •••
with regard to property ..• during the war.••." See, e.g., Allied and Associate Powers and
Hungary, sec. IV, art. 232, annex § 2 (1920) in 15 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. 1 at 98 (1923);
and Turkey, art. 300 (1920), in 15 AM. J. lNT. L. 179 at 262 (1923).
9 The Pellwo~, [1922] 1 A.C. 292, 9 LI. P.C. 147; CoLoMBos, LAw oF PRIZE, 2d ed.,
276 (1940). ·
lOThe Anichab, [1919] P. 329, 9 LI. P.C. ll8; see H. M. Procurator in Egypt v.
Deutsches Kohlen Depot Gesellschaft, (1919] A.C. 291, 8 LI. P.C. 138.
11 The Progress, 1 Edw. 210, 211, 165 Eng. Rep. 1085 (1810).
12 27 & 28 Viet., c. 25, § 16 (1864).

